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INTRODUCTION

The general rule of civil damages in Minnesota is that an injured party may recover only compensation for the actual injury
suffered.' The policy is to award a sum of money to the plaintiff in
an amount equal to his loss or injury, "no more and no less."12 By
focusing on the plaintiffs injury and the proximate and natural
consequences of the wrongful act, the law recognizes that a defendant who violates another person's legal right should make that
3
person whole.
In certain areas, however, the conduct of a person or corporation violating another's legal right is so offensive and repugnant
that, in a sense, the defendant becomes liable to the public. Where
the defendant's conduct or state of mind breaches this larger
duty, 4 the law of damages departs from the general rule of compensation and permits the jury to assess punitive damages. 5 Punitive damages are monetary penalties imposed in excess of the
compensation necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 6 Punitive
1. Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 310, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (1891).
2. Poppen v. Wadleigh, 235 Minn. 400, 404, 51 N.W.2d 75, 78 (1952) (citing Hewson-Herzog Supply Co. v. Minnesota Brick Co., 55 Minn. 530, 534, 57 N.W. 129, 130
(1893)).
3. See Larson, 47 Minn. at 310-11, 50 N.W. at 239-40.
4. See Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200 (Gil. 128, 142) (1862).
5. Id. Minnesota courts historically have used the words "vindictive" and "exemplary" synonymously with the word "punitive" to describe damages that are assessed
against the defendant in addition to compensatory damages. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wolf,
142 Minn. 352, 355, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919) (award of exemplary damages upheld);
Shaber v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 28 Minn. 103, 107, 9 N.W. 575, 577 (1881) (vindictive
damages denied). This Article does not distinguish these various words which embody the
concept of punitive damages.
6. See W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].

The court has described the remedy of punitive damages as follows:
Where a man does a wrong to another and does it oppressively, does it maliciously, does it with a bad motive, does it with a disregard of the other man's
rights, he then subjects himself to exemplary damages . . . [and the jury may
assess what] . . . they think that his conduct deserves, and which will operate as
a deterrent to other people not to do or act in the same manner.
Johnson, 142 Minn. at 355, 172 N.W. at 217 (quoting trial court).
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damages are an exception to the rule of civil damages limiting the
plaintiff's recovery to an amount necessary to compensate for a
loss.7
The United States Supreme Court and state courts recognized
the doctrine of punitive damages by the middle of the nineteenth
century." Thus, when the Minnesota Supreme Court first affirmed
an award of punitive damages in 1862, 9 the court acknowledged
that the principles of punitive damages were "based upon sound
reason, and recognized by too numerous and weighty authorities
to be now disturbed."' 0 The Minnesota Supreme Court considered the law so firmly established that it regularly shrugged its
figurative shoulders" and continued to affirm awards.' 2 The
supreme court has demanded, however, that trial judges closely
control the imposition and assessment of punitive damages' 3 be7. Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 529, 151
N.W.2d 422, 428 (1967).
8. See Ellis, Punitive Damages in Iowa Law. A CriticalAssessment, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1005,
1007-08 (1981) (citing T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 39-43
(1847)).
9. Lynd, 7 Minn. 184 (Gil. 128).
10. Id at 201 (Gil. at 143).
11. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 240, 184 N.W. 964, 966 (1921) (doctrine of punitive damages is too deeply implanted in the law to be uprooted); Baumgartner v. Hodgdon, 105 Minn. 22, 24, 116 N.W. 1030, 1031 (1908) (rule is too deeply settled
as the law of this state to justify a discussion of the general question of allowing punitive
damages in addition to compensation for injuries suffered); McCarthy v. Niskern, 22
Minn. 90, 91 (1875) (doctrine of punitive damages is so firmly rooted in common law that
only an act of the legislature can overturn it).
12. See Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236
N.W. 204, 206 (1931) (punitive damages are an award in excess of actual damages, and
not intended to be compensatory); Yencho v. Kruly, 158 Minn. 408, 410, 197 N.W. 752,
753 (1924) (primary object in action for slander is to obtain a verdict that will compensate
plaintiff for an injury, operate as an example or deterrent to others, and serve as a punishment of defendant); Schmidt, 100 Minn. at 240, 184 N.W. at 965-66 (punitive damages in
any case is an anomoly in the law with no sound reason behind it, "a hybrid between a
display of ethical indignation and the imposition of a fine"); Anderson v. International
Harvester Co. of Am., 104 Minn. 49, 51, 116 N.W. 101, 102 (1908) (punitive damages are
an additional sum that in jury's discretion was proper for purpose of deterring others from
the commission of similar acts in the future); Berg v. St. Paul City Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515,
105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905) (jury may award amount of punitive damages in addition to
compensatory damages if defendant's action is shown to be wanton with a reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights); Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 308, 7 N.W. 263, 263 (1880)
(punitive damages in tort action go beyond plaintiffs pecuniary loss and punish the defendant for the wrong done, and serve as an example to deter others from similar acts);
McCarthy, 22 Minn. at 91 (punitive damages go beyond compensation for actual injury
and assess damages in the nature of a fine upon defendant).
13. See Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.
1982). See generally Alsop & Herr, Punitive Damages in Minnesota Products Liability Cases: A
JudicialPerspective, II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 319 (1985).
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cause the punitive damages award provides a powerful "quasi4
criminal law" remedy for civil wrongs.1
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature codified many of the principles of punitive damages law.' 5 The important provisions of section 549.20 of the Minnesota Statutes include evidentiary
standards which plaintiffs must meet,' 6 guidelines for factfinders to
7
follow in determining the amount of a punitive damages award,'
and a definition of misconduct which plaintiffs must prove in order to recover a punitive award. 8
This Article discusses the dual purposes of punitive damages:
punishment and deterrence. The Article looks to recent Minnesota case law to determine whether the focus of punitive damages
is shifting from the defendant's conduct to the nature of the plaintiff's injury. The Article analyzes the common law in light of Minnesota Statutes section 549.20 by reviewing five topics:
"jurisdiction" over punitive damages; the standard of proof that a
plaintiff must meet; standards of conduct that the defendant must
be shown to have violated; factors considered in determining the
amount of punitive damages, particularly in products liability actions; and a principal's liability for the acts of his agent. The Article concludes that punitive damages in Minnesota provide a quasicriminal remedy, punishing the defendant and rewarding the
plaintiff.
II.

PURPOSES OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The two primary purposes of punitive or exemplary damages
are, as the names suggest, to punish defendants in appropriate
cases and to set an example which will deter others from similar
conduct. 19 The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized these dual
purposes of punishment and deterrence in Lynd v. Picket,20 its first
case involving punitive damages.
In Lynd, a creditor obtained a writ of attachment knowing that
14. See infra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
15. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 838 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 549.20 (1982)).
16. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1982).
17. Id, subd. 3.
18. Id, subd. 1.
19. These purposes are incorporated in the punitive damages provisions of the Minnesota Statutes. See id § 549.20.
20. 7 Minn. 184, 200-01 (Gil. 128, 142-43) (1862).
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the debtor's property was exempt. 2 1 The supreme court concluded
that the creditor's knowledge that the property was exempt
ascribed a "malicious motive" to the act, done for the purpose of
harassing and oppressing the debtor. 2 2 This element of knowledge
converted a case of simple trespass against the debtor into an offense against society that the "law does not tolerate, and justly allows damages by way of punishment and example. "23
A.

Punishment

Punishment of defendants is a fundamental purpose of punitive
damages. 24 The jury has virtually unfettered discretion to award
an amount of punitive damages25 expressing society's "ethical indignation" for the acts of a defendant in a given case. 26 Plaintiffs
realize the immediate tangible benefit of damages exceeding those
necessary to compensate for a loss, and the public presumably realizes a sense of satisfaction in punishing the defendant through his
pocketbook.
.

Resemblance to CriminalSanctions

Society's imposition of punitive damages resembles the imposition of criminal sanctions. The Minnesota Supreme Court has likened the award of punitive damages to the imposition of a fine,
requiring the defendant to have a guilty intention.2 7 As the court
noted in an action for punitive damages involving assault and battery, punitive damages would be appropriate if the act was committed with "criminal indifference to civil obligations. '2 In an
action for assault in the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage, the
court stated that the jury would have discretion to impose punitive
damages if the defendant's purpose was "unlawful," or lawful but
'29
achieved by "unlawful means."
21. Id. at 190-91 (Gil. at 132).
22. Id.at 201 (Gil. at 144).
23. Id (emphasis added).
24. The punishment of a tortfeasor is a function of the defendant's state of mind. An
act committed maliciously, willfully, with a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, or
defined with similar words, justifies an award of punitive damages. For an analysis of the
requisite state of mind, see infra notes 167-99 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the important role of the jury in punitive damages cases, see
infa notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
26. Schmidt, 150 Minn. at 240, 184 N.W. at 966.
27. Id.at 239-40, 184 N.W. at 965-66.
28. Baumgartner, 105 Minn. at 24, 116 N.W. at 1031.
29. Anderson, 104 Minn. at 53, 116 N.W. at 103.
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The role of the jury in evaluating the evidence regarding punitive damages, and awarding such damages as it sees fit, suggests a
trial by peers similar to that in criminal actions. 30 To avoid a civil
law version of "cruel and unusual punishment," 31 the trial court
may reduce an award of punitive damages3 2 which appears to be
activated by "passion or prejudice. '3 3 To further protect the defendant, an appellate court may review 34 punitive damages
35
awards and reverse those that it deems excessively large.
The jury's focus on the defendant's conduct, rather than the
plaintiff's injury,3 6 supports the view that punitive damages are
implicitly criminal in nature. Just as criminal law focuses on the
defendant's behavior, punitive damages are awarded based on the
defendant's intentional and deliberate attitude in violating the
30. See Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Minn. 1980); see also mnfia notes
203-31 and accompanying text.
31. The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
32. Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co., 183 Minn. at 139, 236 N.W. at 206.
33. Sweeney v. Meyers, 199 Minn. 21, 24, 270 N.W. 906, 907 (1937); see also infra notes
206-16 and accompanying text.
34. See Maclnnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 175, 167 N.W. 550,
551 (1918).
35. See Ward v. National Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980) (reversing award of punitive damages for lack of evidence that defendant knew his conduct was
wrong and unlawful).
36. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d
306, 312 (Minn. 1983) (as modified on denial of rehearing) (defendant therapist's knowledge of the rules of his profession proscribing sexual activity with patients tends to establish liability for punitive damages as a result of sexual encounters with patient); Furlev
Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 25-26
(Minn. 1982) (wrongful interference with contract, including the defendant's knowledge
of contract and intentional procurement of breach, which lacked justification, warranted
allowance of punitive damages); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 654
(Minn. 1982) (punitive damages statute requires clear and convincing evidence that defendant's acts showed willful indifference to rights and safety of others); Stuempges v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 1980) (punitive damages are properly
awarded in defamation action); Wilson, 297 N.W.2d at 150 (punitive damages are allowed
only if harm complained of is result of malicious conduct); Cobb v. Midwest Recovery
Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn. 1980) (as amended on denial of rehearing) (punitive damages are awarded only where harm results from conduct "done with malicious,
willful, or reckless disregard of the rights of others"); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361,
363, 191 N.W.2d 433, 434-35 (1971) (quoting Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 76, 90 N.W.
158, 158-59 (1902)) (complaint for punitive damages must allege as ultimate fact that
defendant's purpose or intent was to do the alleged wrongful act); Benson Coop. Creamery
Ass'n, 276 Minn. at 528-30, 151 N.W.2d at 427-28 (award of punitive damages is justified
if wrongful act was done with malice); Hammer v. Forde, 125 Minn. 146, 148-49, 145
N.W. 810, 812 (1914) (corporation is liable for punitive damages attributable to the animus or bad faith misconduct of its agent).
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civil law. 37
The analogy between an award of punitive damages and a criminal sentence should not, however, be given too much weight.
Fundamental distinctions exist between the two. A criminal action threatens to deprive a defendant of his most precious rights:
life and liberty. 38 Civil actions for punitive damages threaten only
loss of money. Because the amount of a punitive damages award is
based in part on the defendant's ability to pay, liability will never
place the defendant in an impossible financial position. Thus, the
two penalties differ in kind, not in degree.
2.

Defendant's Abzh'zy to Pay

The punishment function of punitive damages is best served
when the jury receives evidence of the defendant's financial condition. The rule that the jury may consider the defendant's financial
condition in assessing punitive damages is well-settled. 3 9 Without
evidence of the defendant's pecuniary circumstances, "the jury
could not determine what would be an adequate sum to assess as a
punishment; for what to a man of wealth might be a trifle, for a
'40
poor man might be excessive and cruel punishment.
In Mehna v. Chaph/n,4 the court almost apologetically refused to
reduce an award of punitive damages that the defendant claimed
was excessive because he presented no evidence of his inability to
pay. 42 The court reasoned, "The purpose of punitive damages is
to both punish and deter according to the gravity of the act giving
rise to the punitive damages award, but an award should not exceed the level necessary to properly punish and deter. '43 If the
37. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 2, at 9.
38. Minnesota does not treat petty misdemeanors as crimes because the defendant
cannot be imprisoned for their violation. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 23.06. However, the defendant must still be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 23.05, subd. 3. This requirement probably exists because the police power of the state is brought to bear on the
defendant.
39. See Peck v. Small, 35 Minn. 465, 466, 29 N.W. 69, 70 (1886) (citing McCarthy v.
Niskern, 22 Minn. 90 (1875)) (wealth of defendant may be proved in action for punitive
damages in personal tort); Johnson v. Travis, 33 Minn. 231, 232-33, 22 N.W. 624, 624-25
(1885) (in action for breach of marriage contract, court may instruct jury to consider
defendant's financial condition).
40. McCarthy v. Niskern, 22 Minn. 90, 91 (1875).
41. 327 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1982).
42. Id. at 20 & n.1. The jury had found the defendant liable for assault. Id at 20.
Some of the justices expressed concern that the verdict of $2000 in compensatory damages
and $35,000 in punitive damages was excessive. Id. at 20 n.L
43. Id at 20 n.I (citing Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 529 P.2d 980,
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trial court record had contained any evidence of the defendant's
financial condition, the court apparently would have considered
granting a new trial or remittitur to adjust the punitive damages
44
award to conform with the compensatory damages.
Conduct and ability to pay, the two key factors in a punitive
damages award, were both present in Minnesota's largest recorded
state punitive damages case, Ggyc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.45 In Gc,
the supreme court upheld a one million dollar punitive damages
award against the manufacturer of a highly flammable fabric used
in children's pajamas. 46 The product, "flannelette," met only minimal standards of product flammability as determined by the federal Flammable Fabrics Act, 47 and those standards were
determined by the court to be invalid.48 Consumers unfamiliar
with the flammability characteristics of textiles, and particularly
flannelette, had no knowledge of the inherent danger4 9 The manufacturer was therefore uniquely aware of flannelette's flammable
characteristics. 5 0 In rejecting the manufacturer's argument that
the punitive damages award was excessive, the court stated, "[The
defendant] is a multi-million dollar corporation which reaped substantial profits through the sale of its highly flammable cotton
990, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978)); see also Jensen v. Peterson, 264 N.W.2d 139, 145
(Minn. 1978) (punitive damages depend primarily on defendant's conduct and ability to
pay).
44. See Mena, 327 N.W.2d at 20. The court noted that no testimony was offered
concerning the defendant's ability to pay. Id
45. 297 N.W.2d 727, 741 (Minn.), cert. denied sub noma.
Riegel Textile Corp. v. Gryc,
449 U.S. 921 (1980). See generally Comment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions. A
Look at a Newly ExtendedDoctrine, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 185 (1981) (analyzing Gvc and
concluding that although the court's analysis may have been lacking, Gryc was "an extreme case clearly warranting an award of punitive damages"); 4 HAMLINE L. REV. 351
(1981) (analyzing Gryc and concluding that while punitive damages are appropriate in
products liability actions, Giyc was an inappropriate case).
46. 297 N.W.2d at 729, 741. The court held that the defendant created a substantial
danger to the public by marketing its highly flammable cotton flannelette. Id at 741.
47. Flammable Fabrics Act of 1953, ch. 164, § 4, 67 Stat. 111 (1953), amended by ch.
833, 68 Stat. 770 (1954) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1982)). After the Gryc cause
of action arose, more stringent standards were codified. See Glyc, 297 N.W.2d at 733 n.2;
15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1982).
48. 297 N.W.2d at 733-34. The flannelette product was untreated for flammability
although the manufacturer knew that several inexpensive flame-retardant products and
processes were available to greatly increase the safety of the pajamas without affecting
their appearance or marketability. Id at 739.
49. See id.at 741.
50. Id.at 740. An internal memorandum of the manufacturer pointed out that several clothing fires had occurred, and that the company was sitting on a "powder keg" with
respect to the flammability of flannelette. Id.
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flannelette. We, therefore, do not find that the punitive damages
award was excessive as a matter of law." '5 1 Thus, G7yc demon-

strates that the defendant's financial condition will be seriously
considered by the jury in determining the size of an award necessary to properly punish the defendant, especially when the defendant profited from its misconduct.
B.

Deterrence

The second purpose of Minnesota's punitive damages law is to
deter the defendant and others from committing similar willful
acts in the future.5 2 The deterrence function of punitive damages
is more extensive than the punishment function. As a punishment,
punitive damages affect only a particular defendant. As a deterrent, punitive damages indicate society's expectation of proper
conduct, warning the defendant and others against misbehavior.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed the important
purpose a punitive damages award serves in deterring future misconduct. In Gryc, 53 the defendant-manufacturer argued that an as-

sessment of one million dollars in punitive damages was
inappropriate because it had ceased its willful misconduct.5 4 The
defendant argued that this factor, combined with its contention
that it had suffered financial losses and a damaged reputation, sufficiently deterred any future misconduct and negated any need for
punitive damages. 55 The supreme court disagreed:
This argument ignores the fact that [the defendant] was shown
to have acted in reckless disregard of the public for purely economic reasons in the past. A punitive damages award serves to
redeter [the defendant] from acting in a similar manner with
56
spect to other products manufactured by it in the future.
51. Id at 741. The court noted the defendant continued to market flannelette even
though there were economically feasible measures which could have been taken to reduce
the danger of fire to an acceptable level. Id
52. See, e.g., Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 1980)
(main purpose of punitive damages in slander action is to deter false, malicious, and provocative attacks upon a person's character); Loftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 18283, 126 N.W.2d 154, 154-55 (reason for punitive da rages in libel action is to deter malicious attacks upon a plaintiff's reputation), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845 (1964).
53. 297 N.W.2d 727.
54. Id at 741. The defendant had stopped manufacturing the flannelette product,
and claimed that its previous conduct had been proper since it was complying with federal
standards for children's sleepware that had become more stringent over time. Id
55. Id.
56. Id The court stated that "the potential of compensatory damages awards and
loss of sales and reputation did not serve to deter [the manufacturer] in the past." Id. The
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One case suggests that juries also consider deterrence to be the
most important purpose of punitive damages. In Schoenecke v. Ronningen,57 the plaintiff brought an action for compensatory and punitive damages for alienation of affections. 58 Before trial, the
Minnesota Legislature repealed the statute giving rise to the claim
for relief.59 The jury interrupted its deliberations and expressed
concern that punitive damages would not serve a purpose in the
case because the defendant's conduct was no longer illegal. 60 The
judge instructed the jury that an award of punitive damages re6
mained in its discretion. '
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court has held repeatedly
that the purpose of punitive damages is to deter both the defendant and others from engaging in misconduct, 6 2 it has recently departed from that rule. In Thompson v. Estate of Petro, 3 the court
held that the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages from
the estate of a dead tortfeasor. 64 Although the court noted that the
decedent's act was "particularly brutal," and that the plaintiff
probably would have recovered punitive damages if the decedent
was alive, it concluded that punitive damages would serve no purpose. 65 The court reasoned, "the purpose of punitive damages is to
punish the tortfeasor where the act is malicious or wilful, and to
deter him from repeating the wrongful act."'66 The court rejected
the argument that others will be deterred from wrongful conduct
defendant could not, therefore, argue that these considerations would act as an adequate
deterrent to the defendant in the future. Id. The defendant overlooked the fact that one
of the functions of a punitive damages award is to punish past conduct. Id
57. 315 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1982).
58. Id.at 614. The plaintiff claimed the defendant had been having an affair with the
plaintiff's wife, and that this caused the breakup of the plaintiff's marriage. The complaint alleged two counts: alienation of affection and criminal conversion. Each count
requested $50,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Id The
trial court dismissed the claim for criminal conversion. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff
$122,000 in general damages, but refused to award punitive damages. Id
59. Id
60. Id.
61. Id The trial judge responded to the jury's request for additional instructions by
saying, "Well, I would just have to leave that to your judgment and-to determine
whether you believe justice requires it then. And that's at your option." Id The jury
subsequently awarded no punitive damages. Id
62. See, e.g., Vine v. Casmey, 86 Minn. 74, 75-76, 90 N.W. 158, 158 (1902); Boetcher v.
Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 308, 7 N.W. 263, 263 (1880) (punitive damages are intended as an
example to deter defendant and others from similar acts).
63. 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982).
64. Id at 408.
65. Id
66. Id (emphasis added).
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knowing that their estates would be liable for punitive damages if
they died before judgment. 61 Instead, the court concluded, "[The
tortfeasor] is dead; to punish his estate instead would be to ignore
the entire purpose of punitive damages.

'68

Whether a tortfeasor would be deterred by an award of punitive
damages against his own estate is not certain. The Petroff court
failed, however, to explain how the ironically fortuitous death of
the tortfeasor mitigated society's need to deter such conduct.
What Petroffdoes suggest is that the dual purposes of punishment
and deterrence must be served to justify an award of punitive
damages in a particular case.
C

Eisert: A Change in Emphasis?

The Minnesota Supreme Court's analysis of punitive damages

69
in the 1982 case of Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co.

departs startlingly from the traditional functions of punitive damages. 70 It is not clear whether the decision is an aberration, or a
change in emphasis on the factors necessary to prove a case of punitive damages.
In Eisert, two students died in a fire that started in the auto body
shop at their vocational school and spread throughout the building.7' The plaintiff trustees for the heirs of the deceased brought a
wrongful death cause of action, and the plaintiff school district
sought damages for property loss under products liability.7 2 The
plaintiffs alleged that the toxic smoke and fuel which sustained the
fire was caused by burning foam insulation and paint applied to
the building. 73 They also alleged that the defendant manufacturers and sellers represented these products to be self-extinguishing
74
and fire-retardant.
At the time Eisert was decided, Minnesota's wrongful death statute was interpreted by the court as proscribing punitive damages. 7 , The supreme court therefore affirmed the trial court's
67. Id
68. Id
69. 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
70. See infra
notes 114-21 and accompanying text (review of ESTert pursuant to Minnesota's punitive damages statute).
71. 314 N.W.2d at 227.
72. Id
73. Id
74. Id
75. See infra
notes 122-26 and accompanying text (discussing wrongful death actions
as judicial exception to punitive damages awards).
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decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the trustees'
punitive damages claim. The court also denied the school district's motion for leave to amend its complaint to claim punitive
damages for property loss arising from the destruction of the
76
building.
In denying the school district's motion, the Ezseri court considered only the nature of the plaintiffs loss, not the defendants' conduct. It held that the plaintiffs loss is not always considered in
determining whether to assess punitive damages, 77 but "it may
reasonably be taken into account in deciding whether punitive
damages will be allowed." ' 78 The court concluded:
Where [the] injury is limited to property damage, the public
interest in punishment and deterrence is largely satisfied by the
plaintiff's recovery of compensatory damages. Punitive damages represent an extraordinary measure of deterrence. Denying their imposition in this case, after allowing punitive
damages in strict liability actions for personal injury, reflects
the higher value our society places on the safety of persons than
79
it does on the security of property.
The court's focus on the nature of the plaintiffs injury, rather
than on the conduct of the defendant, ignores the 120-year-old law
of punitive damages. Prior to Ezserl, the nature of the plaintiffs
injury was not a legal consideration in determining punitive damages. 8° Several years earlier, the court stated, contrary to Eiserl,
that evidence of the plaintiffs condition is obviously not relevant
unless the defendant takes special advantage of that condition.8
Conduct amounting to gross negligence, malice, fraud, and oppression is punishable by punitive damages. By focusing only on
76. Id at 228. Both the trustees and the school district appealed. Id.; see infra notes
109-21 and accompanying text (discussion of punitive damages in cases limited to claims
for property damages).
77. 314 N.W.2d at 229 (citing MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1980)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 19-68 and accompanying text (discussing policy of punishment and
deterrence).
81. AccordJensen v. Peterson, 264 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn. 1978); cf.Caspersen v.
Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973) (examining defendant's intentional conduct). This focus on defendant's conduct has important implications for assessing liability
for punitive damages against the appropriate party. In Caspersen, the court held that an
insurance company was not required to reimburse its insured for a punitive damages judgment. The court stated that the insurer's obligation to insure for actual damages does not

extend to damages assessed for punishment of willful conduct. Id at 99-100, 213 N.W.2d
at 331.
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the plaintiffs injury, however, the Eiserl court ignored conduct alleged to be. willful, wanton, and malicious. The defendants escaped liability because nobody still living was hurt. Fortunately
for the defendants, in terms of their liability, the only persons who
were trapped in the burning building died in the fire. The defendants had no guarantee, however, that the fire in the auto body
shop would not cause injury. Thus, the court ignored its own interpretation of the law as set forth in Gryc. "[T]he state punitive
damages remedy concerns the vital state interest of protecting persons against personal injury. It seeks to protect state citizens from
the willful, wanton, and reckless manufacture [of a defective
82
product].'
Other decisions by the Minnesota Supreme Court suggest that
Ezserl represents a departure from the settled principles of punitive
damages. 8 3 Unless the punitive damages remedy is accepted judicially as more than a form of civil punishment and expression of
society's disapproval of unacceptable conduct, the supreme court
should reaffirm that punishment and deterrence of unacceptable
conduct are the exclusive focus of the law of punitive damages.
III.

MINNESOTA'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATUTE

In 1978, as part of comprehensive tort reform legislation, the
Minnesota Legislature enacted the state's first statute governing
the standards to be used in awarding punitive damages. 84 The
82. Gyc, 297 N.W.2d at 737.
83. See Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d
306, 311-12 (Minn. 1983) (as modified on denial of rehearing) (court should consider defendant's conduct, interests invaded, and deterrence); Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324
N.W.2d 652, 654 (Minn. 1982) (focus on defendant's willful indifference to others' rights
and safety); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980).
84. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 738, § 4, 1978 Minn. Laws 836, 838 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 549.20 (1982)). The statute applies to actions commenced on or after April 15,
1978. Id.§ 11, 1978 Minn. Laws at 842. The statute provides:
Subdivision 1. Punitive damages shall be allowed in civil actions only
upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful
indifference to the rights or safety of others.
Subd. 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or
principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved
the act.
Subd. 3. Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors which justly bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the seri-
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Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the statute so as to suggest
that recovery of punitive damages will now be increasingly
85
difficult.
The statute codifies five separate aspects of punitive damages
developed in the common law:
(a) the "jurisdiction" over punitive damages;
(b) the standard of proof that a plaintiff must meet;
(c) the standards of conduct that the defendant has violated;
(d) the factors determining an amount of punitive damages,
particularly in products liability actions; and
86
(e) a principal's liability for the acts of his agent.
While the legislature previously had allowed punitive damage
awards in certain actions8 7 and limited them in others, 88 the new
ousness of hazard to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the
profitability of the misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct
and any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard
and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct, the number and level of the employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the defendant, and
the total effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a
result of the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damage awards
to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty to which the defendant may be subject.
MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982).
85. See Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52-53 (Minn. 1983) (no
punitive damages in a contract action); Ulecht, 324 N.W.2d at 654 (trial court did not err
in refusing to allow amendment for punitive damages); Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228-29 (punitive damages are not available in wrongful death action or in action for strict liability
for plaintiffs property loss); Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 297, 309-11 (Minn. 1980) (no punitive damages in a contract
action).
86. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20.
87. The Worker's Compensation Act provides for the recovery of punitive damages
by the state treasurer against a non-insured employer, in an amount not to exceed 50% of
all amounts paid out. Id § 176.183, subd. 1 (Supp. 1983). Minnesota's Privacy of Communications Act provides for punitive damages in civil actions against any person who
violates the Act. Id § 626A. 13(c) (1982). Subdivision 2 of the Minnesota Human Rights
Act allows for the award of punitive damages in an amount of no more than $6000 to an
aggrieved party who has suffered discrimination. Id § 363.071, subd. 2 (Supp. 1983). A
person or governmental body injured by a person littering from a vehicle may recover
punitive damages in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars. Id § 169.421, subd. 4
(1982). The Minnesota Truth in Repairs Act provides in part for punitive damages to a
customer aggrieved by a violation of the Act in an amount not to exceed three times the
total repair charges. Id § 325F.63, subd. 1 (1982).
88. Minnesota Statutes § 3.736, subd. 3 (1982) provides, "The state will not pay punitive damages" in tort claims against the state. Se also id § 466.04, subd. I (Supp. 1983)
("No award for damages on such claim [against a municipality's officers or employees]
shall include punitive damages").
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statute is its first attempt to govern the standards for awarding
punitive damages in all civil actions.
In drafting section 549.20, the legislature recognized that punitive damages are not universally accepted. Judges and commentators who historically have criticized the doctrine of punitive
damages have relied on various grounds, including: (1) that such
damages unjustly enrich the plaintiff; (2) that compensatory damages fully serve the stated purposes of punitive damages; (3) that
the lack of an objective basis to guide an award of punitive damages invites abuse and overly severe sanctions against defendants;
and (4) that punitive damages usurp a function of the criminal
law, without providing the defendant with the proper criminal
procedural safeguards. 89 Section 549.20 was drafted responsively
to such criticisms. The statute clarifies the limits of punitive damages and provides direction for their award.
A. Jurisdiction
I.

Generally

Subdivision one of section 549.20 contains a jurisdictional statement, and provides an evidentiary standard for proving claims of
punitive damages. 90 The subdivision states, "Punitive damages
shall be allowed in civil actions only upon clear and convincing
evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference
to the rights or safety of others." 9 1 This language suggests that the
legislature intended plaintiffs to be able to bring their claims for
punitive damages in any action, unless the trial judge cannot be
convinced that the case warrants punitive damages. This subdivision is a rational approach to the issue if the punitive damages
89. See generally Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should
Not Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46 (1978). The authors note that four states, Massachusetts, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington, have rejected the doctrine of punitive
damages. Id at 55; see Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 254, 262, 43 So. 2d 599, 601 (1949);
Boott Mills v. Boston & Me. R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 589, 106 N.E. 680, 683 (1914); Wilfong
v. Omaha & C.B.S. Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 607, 262 N.W. 537, 540 (1935); Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 898, 246 P.2d 853, 855 (1952) ("except when explicitly allowed by
statute"). Coccia and Morrissey also note that in England, punitive damages are very
restricted and may be awarded only: (a) where there is "oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional action by the servants of the government"; (b) where "the defendant's conduct
has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff"; or (c) where punitive damages "are expressly [authorized] by statute." Coccia & Morrissey, supra, at 56 (quoting Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C.
1129, 1226-27).
90. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. I (1982).
91. Id.
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remedy is to be "action blind"; regardless of the injury the plaintiff
has suffered, the defendant's conduct is a separate substantive issue. The plaintiff should also be required to meet the stiff evidentiary burden because of the quasi-criminal nature of the award,
and the potentially harsh economic consequences punitive damages pose for the defendant.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established, however, that
plaintiffs will continue to be precluded from recovering punitive
damages in certain civil actions. Common law prior and subsequent to the enactment of the statute has excepted certain substantive areas of the law from awards of punitive damages.
2. Judicially CreatedExceptions
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff is limited to compensatory damages for the actual injury suffered in
three areas of substantive law: contracts, strict liability for property damage, and wrongful death. Although the Minnesota Legislature has overruled the exception for wrongful death,9 2 the
common law exception provides an important historical perspective for understanding the wrongful death statute.
a.

Contracts

Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages in breach of contract actions 93 even if the defendant had a malicious motive for
breaching the contract,9 4 consciously and deliberately breached
92. See id § 573.02 (Supp. 1983) (In an action for wrongful death, "Punitive damages
may be awarded as provided in section 549.20").
93. See Barr/Nelson, Inc. v. Tonto's, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46, 52 (Minn. 1983) (bond
contract); Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T.V. Improvement Ass'n, 294
N.W.2d 297, 309-10 (Minn. 1980) (contract); Cherne Indus. Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs.,
Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 95 (Minn. 1979) (covenant not to compete); Haagenson v. National
Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979) (insurance
policy); Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1979) (insurance policy); Moore
v. John E. Blomquist, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 518, 518 (Minn. 1977) (lease); Francis v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 264, 59 N.W. 1078, 1081 (1894) (failure of telegraph company to send telegraph). Excluded from this discussion are the cases dealing with the
antiquated tort action for breach of marriage contract. See Sneve v. Lunder, 100 Minn. 5,
6, 110 N.W. 99, 100 (1907) ("In an action of this character the jury may, in its discretion,
allow punitive damages if the evidence shows that the conduct of the defendant was wanton and ruthless and of such a character as to manifest an intention unnecessarily to
wound her feelings, injure her reputation, and destroy her future prospects"); Clement v.
Brown, 57 Minn. 314, 315-16, 59 N.W. 198, 198-99 (1894); Johnson v. Travis, 33 Minn.
231, 232, 22 N.W. 624, 624 (1885).
94. See Barr/Nelson, Inc., 336 N.W.2d at 52-53. "Unless the willful and malicious con-
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the contract, 95 or breached the contract in bad faith. 96 A plaintiff
may only recover punitive damages in a contract case if the breach
was accompanied by an independent tort such as fraud. 97 The
cases denying punitive damages in contract actions lack justification for the exception. Theoretically, the malice, bad faith, or willful indifference of a tort defendant should be as unacceptable in
contract law. Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in
1920, "The motives prompting the breach of a contract are immaterial, so far as the rule of damages is concerned, and, however
malicious or wrongful, the measure of compensation remains the
same." 98

In 1983, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule barring punitive damages in contract cases. In Barr/Nelson, Inc. v.
Tonto-s, Inc., 99 the court distinguished between the defendant's malicious motive and a malicious breach of contract action. The
court held that "malicious motive goes only to determining
whether a material breach has occurred, but is immaterial insofar
as damages for contract breach are concerned."' °
The rule excluding punitive damages in contract cases often affects disputes between insurance companies and their insureds.
Typically, the insurer balks at paying a claim that the insured believes is valid. The insured then must sue the insurer, and if the
insured believes the insurer acted maliciously or in bad faith in
refusing to pay the claim, the action will include a request for punitive damages. Under Minnesota law, the insurance policy is a
contract, and the defendant's refusal to pay a valid claim is merely
a breach of contract, not entitling the plaintiff to punitive
damages.' 0 '
A better rule would treat an egregious breach of contract as a
separate actionable tort entitling the plaintiff to seek punitive
duct constitutes an independent tort, Minnesota law does not permit recovery of punitive
damages." Id at 52.
95. See Minnesota-Iowa Television Co., 294 N.W.2d at 309.
96. See Moore, 256 N.W.2d at 518; Wild v. Rarig, 302 Minn. 419, 441-42, 234 N.W.2d
775, 790 (1975) (bad faith termination is not an independent tort), appeal dismissed, 424
U.S. 902 (1976).
97. See Toshoku Am., Inc. v. Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., Civil No. 4-79-339 (D. Minn.
Sept. 18, 1981).
98. Independent Grocery Co. v. Sun Ins. Co., 146 Minn. 214, 217, 178 N.W. 582, 583
(1920), overruled on other grounds in Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 388 (Minn. 1979).
99. 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1983).
100. Id.at 52-53.
101. See Haagenson, 277 N.W.2d at 652; Olson, 277 N.W.2d at 387-88; Independent Grocery
Co., 146 Minn. at 217, 178 N.W. at 583.
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damages. The dual functions of punitive damages, punishment
and deterrence, would be particularly well-served in these cases
since bad faith conduct by an insurer has undoubtedly compounded a trauma experienced by the insured. In Mze v. Harford
Insurance Co., 10 2 a federal court applying the law of Virginia held
that where a breach of contract imposes hardship on the plaintiff,
the damages award should be "governed by the same standard as
are punitive damages in any tort case."' 0 3
As noted, subdivision one of section 549.20 allows punitive damages in civil actions. 0 4 Although this language does not distinguish tort from contract actions, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has reaffirmed the well-settled exception for contract cases since
the statute's enactment.
In Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v. Watonwan T V Improvement Association,10 5 the supreme court reasoned that the legislature enacted
the statute because of concerns about the frequency and size of
punitive damages awards in products liability cases.10 6 Thus, the
court concluded that the legislature did not intend the statute to
extend to a new line of cases. 0 7 "We believe that if the legislature
had intended to overrule the line of cases prohibiting punitive
damages in contract cases, it would have specifically provided for
such awards in the statute."' 10 8
b.

Property Loss

Strict liability actions in which the plaintiff's compensatory
damages are limited to his property loss provide the second narrow
exception to the availability of punitive damages. Interpretation
of strict liability law supports the exception. 0 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court first recognized the doctrine of
102. 567 F. Supp. 550 (W.D. Va. 1982).
103. Id at 555. In Mlre, an insurance company refused to pay a homeowner's claim
following a fire. Id at 551. The company demanded that the homeowner take a polygraph test to prove that she was not the arsonist, but she refused to take the test. Id at
552. Although the company knew that fire officials had ceased their investigations, and
despite the fact that its adjuster recommended that the claim be paid, the company refused to do so. Id at 554.
104. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
105. 294 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 1980).
106. Id at 310.
107. Id at 311.
108. Id; see also Barr/Nelson, Inc., 336 N.W.2d at 52 (citing with approval MinnesotaIowa Television Co., 294 N.W.2d at 311) ("unlikely that the legislature intended to extend
[punitive] damage awards to contract actions").
109. See Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228-29.
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strict liability in McCormack v. Hankscraf/ Co. 110 The plaintiff based
her products liability action on only negligence and warranty theories, but the court enlarged the defendant manufacturer's liability to encompass a strict liability standard."' The extension of
liability was based on fairness to the plaintiffs, not unacceptability
of the defendant's conduct.
[S]ubjecting a manufacturer to liability without proof of negligence or privity of contract, as the rule intends, imposes the cost
of injury resulting from a defective product upon the maker,
who can both most effectively reduce or eliminate the hazard to
life and health, and absorb and pass on such costs, instead of
upon the consumer, who possesses neither the skill nor the
means necessary to protect himself adequately from either the
risk of injury or its disastrous consequences.' 12
This emphasis on the product, rather than on the defendant's
conduct, is reflected in the four elements of a prima facie case of
strict liability: (1) the plaintiff was injured; (2) the defendant's
product caused the injury; (3) the injury occurred because the defendant's product was defective; and (4) the defect was present in
the product when the defendant sold it.1 3 Thus, in strict liability
actions, the defendant's conduct or knowledge is not relevant to
liability. It follows that punitive damages serve no purpose in actions based solely on strict liability.
The strict liability exception was enunciated in Ezer."1 4 If the
Eisert court had based its opinion on strict liability law alone, the
result would have been consistent with the dual functions of punitive damages. Instead, the court denied punitive damages based
on the nature of the plaintiff's injury, and departed from the wellsettled rule that punitive damages are intended to punish"- 5 and
deter" 6 defendants and others. The legislature codified the principles of punishment and deterrence in the punitive damages statute" 7 four years prior to Esert. Whether the injury is personal
110. 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
111. Id at 338, 154 N.W.2d at 500.
112. Id
113. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. 1982) (quoting Kerr v.
Corning Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 117, 169 N.W.2d 587, 588 (1969)).
114. Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 1982).
115. See supra notes 24-51 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text.
117. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1982) (listing only factors pertaining to the defendant's conduct, knowledge, remorse or lack thereof, and financial condition in measuring an award of punitive damages).
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harm or loss of property should not be relevant.
One recent supreme court opinion, if read with Esert, suggests
that Eisert will continue to apply only to property damage actions
in strict liability. In Wilson v. City of Eagan,"8 the supreme court
upheld an award of punitive damages against a municipal animal
warden for negligently destroying the plaintiff's pet cat in violation of state law." 9 The court concluded that the warden did not
act with malice toward the plaintiff since he did not know who
owned the cat.120 "Nevertheless, the award of punitive damages
was appropriate because [the warden's] conduct in killing the cat
within hours of its impoundment evinces a willful disregard for
both the law and the property rights ofprivate citizens. ,-21 Wilson therefore properly focuses the factfinder's attention on the defendant's
conduct without regard to the nature of the plaintiff's injuries.
E'sert's unfortunate effect is that defendants may move the court
to ignore allegations of a malicious and reprehensible course of
conduct, and to dismiss a claim for punitive damages solely because the plaintiff suffered only property damage. If a defective
and unreasonably dangerous product causes a fire that leads to the
destruction of a building, the manufacturer whose conduct is
proven to be willfully indifferent to the safety of others should not
be allowed to escape liability for punitive damages solely because
of the good fortune that nobody was injured. Punitive damages
should be awarded in order to deter the defendant and similarly
situated persons from engaging in similar reprehensible conduct.
Eisert is in need of clarification to reaffirm that the principles of
punitive damages apply in all civil actions involving willful misconduct by defendants, regardless of whether the plaintiff suffers
personal injury or property damage.
c.

Wrongful Death Actions

The third judicial exception applied to wrongful death actions.
Until June 1983, Minnesota's wrongful death act limited the nextof-kin's recovery to their "proportionate" pecuniary loss.' 2 2

A

common law proscription of punitive damages in wrongful death
cases and the supreme court's equally narrow interpretation of the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980).
Id.at 151.
Id
Id (emphasis added).
MINN. STAT. § 573.02, subd. 1 (1982).
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wrongful death statute were inconsistent with the purposes of punitive damages. The unavailability of punitive damages in wrongful death cases prevented the next-of-kin from sharing in the
proceeds of a lawsuit that the decedent, had he lived, presumably
could have brought and won.' 23 Whether the decedent's heirs, or
the plaintiff who survives to sue, benefits from a judgment, punitive damages should be assessed if the defendant's conduct warrants punishment or deterrence.
In several cases, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the
statute as an expression of legislative intent to preclude punitive
damages in wrongful death actions.1 24 In deciding Ezsert in 1982,
the supreme court recognized that the rule was illogical because
malicious tortfeasors benefited from having the potential plaintiffs
die. "Although the disparate treatment of the tortfeasor who injures and the tortfeasor who causes death may appear inequitable,
any change in the recovery for wrongful death that is not permitted by fair interpretation of the statute is for the legislature to
make."'' 25 In 1983, the legislature overruled these cases by amending the wrongful death statute as follows: "Punitive damages may
be awarded as provided in section 549.20."126
B.

Standard of Proof

Subdivision one of the punitive damages statute provides that a
plaintiff may recover punitive damages only upon a showing of
"clear and convincing evidence."'' 27 Minnesota courts have defined clear and convincing as a standard falling between "a pre2 8
ponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable doubt.'
Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator Co., 47 Minn. 161, 164, 49 N.W. 694, 695
Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry., 44 Minn. 5, 6, 46 N.W. 79, 80 (1890).
See Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228; Gunderson, 47 Minn. at 164, 49 N.W. at 695; HutchMinn. at 9, 46 N.W. at 81.
Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 228.
Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 347, § 2, 1983 Minn. Laws 2397-98 (codified at MINN.
STAT. § 573.02, subd. I (Supp. 1983)). This amendment to the wrongful death statute
does not appear to overrule the supreme court's decision in Thompson v. Estate of Petroff,
319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn. 1982), proscribing claims for punitive damages against the estate
of a deceased tortfeasor.
127. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1 (1982).
128. See Benson v. LaBatte, 288 N.W.2d 684, 686 (Minn. 1979) (in a paternity action,
Minnesota Statutes §§ 257.251-.31 require clear and convincing proof); see also Weber v.
Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1979) (paternity case stating that clear and convincing proof "means exactly what is suggested by the ordinary meaning of the terms
making up the phrase"); Kavanagh v. Golden Rule, 226 Minn. 510, 516, 33 N.W.2d 697,
701 (1948) (clear and convincing evidence needed to prove parol modification of written
123.
(1891);
124.
ins, 44
125.
126.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1985

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 3
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

The clear and convincing standard is a change from the common
law, where the plaintiff was required to meet only the preponderance of the evidence standard normally required in civil litigation.
The legislature recognized the quasi-criminal nature of punitive
damages,12 9 and attempted to provide additional safeguards for
defendants. 130
1. Pleadtng
Since the plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages as a matter
of right,13 1 it follows that the court will demand some evidence of
unacceptable conduct by the defendant before allowing the jury to
consider whether to award punitive damages. It is increasingly
difficult for plaintiffs to have claims for punitive damages submitted to the jury.
To commence an action claiming punitive damages, the plaintiff's complaint need comply only with the minimal requirements
of notice pleading. In Huebsch v. Larson,' 32 the jury awarded the
plaintiff punitive damages even though he had not specifically
claimed punitive damages or pled facts necessary to establish such
a claim. 133 The plaintiff had alleged as an ultimate fact that the
defendant intended the alleged wrongful act, and did it wantonly,

134
maliciously, or with the purpose of oppressing or insulting him.

The trial court granted the defendants judgment notwithstanding
instrument); Gendreau v. North Am. Life & Casualty Co., 158 Minn. 259, 262, 197 N.W.
257, 258 (1924) (to avoid written contract on ground of mistake, the mistake must be
established by clear and convincing evidence); Hogan v. Twin City Amusement Trust
Estate, 155 Minn. 199, 202-03, 193 N.W. 122, 123-24 (1923) (erroneous application of
"clear and satisfactory" standard in workmens' compensation case).
129. The Senate author of Minnesota's punitive damages statute, MINN. STAT.
§ 549.20, was Senator Jack Davies. In discussing the appropriateness of requiring a higher
standard of proof in awarding punitive damages, Senator Davies noted the quasi-criminal
nature of punitive damages. See Meeting on HF 338 Before the Minnesota Senate Jud iary
Committee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., Feb. 22, 1978 (audio tape).
130. On the issue of punitive damages violating defendants' constitutional rights, see
generally DuBois, Punitive Damages In Personal Injury, Products Liabiliy And ProfessionalMalpractice Cases. Bonanza Or Disaster, 43 INS. COUNCIL J. 344 (1976); Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 408 (1967).
131. See Comment, supra note 45, at 186 & n.5.
132. 291 Minn. 361, 191 N.W.2d 433 (1971). Plaintiff's calves had wandered onto
defendant's land, and defendant made only a minimal effort to locate their owner. Despite knowing that the cattle were not his own, defendant sold them and kept the proceeds. Id
133. Id at 363, 191 N.W.2d at 434-35.
134. Id
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the verdict on the punitive damages claim.13 5 The supreme court
reversed, holding that the liberal construction of pleadings notified
36
the defendant that the plaintiff was seeking punitive damages.'
The court reasoned that notice pleadings need only give the de13 7.
fendant fair warning that punitive damages will be litigated.
2.

Getting to theJury

Pleading a case for punitive damages is easier than persuading a
judge to submit the question to the jury. Courts have allowed
claims for punitive damages to go to the jury "ifany evidence"
warranted the allowance of an award. 3 This relatively minimal
standard requires the plaintiff to make some showing of unacceptable conduct by the defendant to get a claim for punitive damages
to the jury.
Courts have not hesitated to dismiss the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages under the "any evidence" standard. In Benson Cooperative Creamery Association v. First District Association,' 39 the

supreme court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs action for
wrongful expulsion from a cooperative association, but affirmed
the summary dismissal of its claim for punitive damages. 40 The
defendant, an association of dairy cooperatives, expelled the plaintiff and cancelled the plaintiff's ownership shares after the plaintiff
joined a competing organization.1 4' Although the court ordered a
trial on whether the plaintiff had been wrongfully expelled, it held
that an unlawful action, if proved, would not support an award of
punitive damages. 42 "The pretrial depositions establish conclusively that the [defendant association] acted in good faith, believing it had a right to expel Benson . . . . In as much as the
[defendant] acted in good faith . . .there is no ground for assess' 43
ing punitive damages.' 1
135. Id.at 362, 191 N.W.2d at 434.
136. Id at 363, 191 N.W.2d at 435.
137. Id. The defendant had adequate notice of the punitive damages claim because
plaintiff had asked for an instruction on punitive damages and because the trial court had
overruled defendant's objections to questions about his assets. Id; see also supra notes 39-51
and accompanying text (evidence of wealth).
138. Hutbsch, 291 Minn. at 364, 191 N.W.2d at 435; Johnson v. Wolf, 142 Minn. 352,
354, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919).
139. 276 Minn. 520, 151 N.W.2d 422 (1967).
140. Id. at 528, 151 N.W.2d at 427.
141. Id.at 524, 151 N.W.2d at 425.
142. Id at 528-29, 151 N.W.2d at 427-28.
143. Id at 529, 151 N.W.2d at 428.
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Under the Minnesota punitive damages statute, 144 which became effective eleven years after Benson, the evidentiary standard
for submitting a claim for punitive damages to the jury is more
difficult from the plaintiff's point of view. While many cases decided after the statute became effective do not cite the statute, the
courts have summarily dismissed claims for punitive damages
when the plaintiffs did not convincingly prove that the defendants
should be punished.'

45

The Minnesota Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals applying Minnesota law have held that the defendant
who acts wrongfully but in good faith cannot be liable for punitive
damages because his conduct, by definition, is not malicious. Consequently, in Roworth v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co., ' 46 the
Eighth Circuit upheld summary judgment on a claim for punitive
damages against a plaintiff wrongfully denied a disability benefit
check.' 4 7 The plaintiff had not contested that the defendant followed a well-established routine in processing the check or that he
in good faith did not qualify for the funds. 148 The court held that
even when considering the evidence in favor of the plaintiff, no
grounds existed for submitting the issue of punitive damages to the
jury. 149
MINN. STAT. § 549.20.
145. See, e.g., Eisert v. Greenberg Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 314 N.W.2d 226, 229
(Minn. 1982) (judges should exercise close control over the imposition and assessment of
punitive damages).
146. 674 F.2d 756 (8th Cir. 1982).
147. Id at 759.
148. Id
149. Id. In Cobb v. Midwest Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980) (as
amended on denial of rehearing), the supreme court refused to assess punitive damages
against a finance company that wrongfully repossessed plaintiff's truck based on a "good
faith reasonable interpretation" of § 9-503 of the Minnesota Uniform Commercial Code,
MINN. STAT. § 336.9-503 (1982). Id at 237-38.
In Ward v. National Car Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980), the
supreme court reversed an award of punitive damages, holding that the trial court improperly submitted the issue to the jury. Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested when defendant's agent thought plaintiff had stolen a rented car. Id. at 442-43. Plaintiff thought he
had properly rented the car and took the keys from the unattended rental booth. Id at
442. The agent, however, had left a note asking to be called before plaintiff took the car.
Id The court said:
There is no evidence from which it can be inferred that [the rental agent] knew
his conduct was wrong and unlawful nor does the record show aggravating circumstances from which malice might be inferred. In the absence of such evidence, the issue of punitive damages was improperly submitted to the jury and
the award for such damages must be reversed.
Id. at 443.
144.
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The increasing reluctance of the courts to submit claims for punitive damages to the jury is also reflected in stricter scrutiny of
plaintiffs' requests for leave to amend their pleadings to claim punitive damages. In Uecht v. Shopko Department Store,'50 the plaintiff
sued for defamation after learning that a sign was posted on the
defendant's cash registers warning its clerks not to accept the
plaintiff's credit card.1 5- The defendant posted the signs after the
plaintiff's wife told him that she had lost her checkbook and credit
cards. 52 The plaintiff was angered by what he perceived to be a
smear against his reputation. 53 The trial court dismissed the
plaintiffs defamation action and denied his motion for leave to
154
amend his complaint to assert a claim for punitive damages.
The supreme court ordered a trial on the defamation issue, but
granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages.' 55 The evidence indicated that the defendant may
have been negligent at most in posting the signs as worded, 56 and
that mere negligence does not support a punitive damages
award. 57 The court stated that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the amendment to the complaint because
Minnesota's punitive damages statute requires clear and convinc58
ing evidence of willful acts by the defendant.1
150. 324 N.W.2d 652 (Minn. 1982).
151. Id at 653.
152. Id (Shopko had posted signs on cash registers in check-out lanes stating "Shopper's Charge-Robert Utecht-Do Not Accept").
153. Id
154. See id.
155. Id.at 652.
156. Id at 654.
157. Id.; see also Cobb, 295 N.W.2d at 237 (statute does not permit recovery of punitive
damages for mere negligence).
158. See Utecht, 324 N.W.2d at 654. Minnesota Statutes § 549.20 allows punitive damages in civil actions "only upon clear and convincing evidence that the acts of the defendant show a willful indifference to the rights or safety of others." MINN. STAT. § 549.20,
subd. 1 (1982).
In Abel v. J.C. Penney Co., 488 F. Supp. 891 (D.Minn. 1980), aft'd,660 F.2d 720 (8th
Cir. 1981), the court stayed plaintiffs' pretrial motion to submit their claim for punitive
damages to the jury. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturers and retailer of a flannel nightgown
their daughter was wearing when it caught fire. Id 'at 893, 660 F.2d at 721. The daughter's grandmother had purchased a Simplicity pattern and flannel fabric manufactured by
Lowenstein from the J.C. Penney Company. Id at 893, 660 F.2d at 720. The grandmother, an experienced seamstress, knew the difference between untreated fabric and
flame-retardant fabric, but testified that she preferred untreated fabric because of its texture and unobjectionable smell. 660 F.2d at 720. Plaintiffs argued that defendant was
aware of similar fires in children's flannel nightgowns, and that it knew of commercially
feasible, flame-retardant processes for treating such garments. 488 F. Supp. at 895-96.
The court held that plaintiffs must prove that the defendant acted "willfully, wantonly or
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The Utecht court was therefore able to accomplish the perceived
legislative goal of controlling punitive damages awards. The court
focused on the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's insufficient
evidence, rather than on the nature of the plaintiff's injury.
3.

Requirement of Actual Damages

In most cases, the plaintiff must prove that he is entitled to actual or compensatory damages before the trial court will allow punitive damages.159 The rule requiring proof of actual damages as a
prerequisite for punitive damages does not serve the dual purposes
of punitive damages. While it is difficult to imagine a situation
that would leave the plaintiff without recourse against the defendant solely because he could not prove actual damages, the focus on
the plaintiff's compensatory claim is not relevant to the punishment and deterrence of the defendant's misconduct. 60 Nevertheless, if the trial court fails to give a punitive damages instruction
and the jury awards no actual damages, there is no reversible
error. 161
In one class of cases, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has expressly eliminated the requirement that the plaintiff first
prove actual damages before bringing a valid action for punitive
damages. The exception applies to the law of defamation. In defamation actions, the court has reasoned that the plaintiff may suffer intangible harm as a result of the defendant's false and
irresponsible accusations. 162 In the interest of discouraging such
conduct and encouraging social harmony, an action for punitive
in reckless disregard of the rights of others" before the jury could consider the punitive
damages issue. Id.at 896.
159. See, e.g., Meixner v. Buecksler, 216 Minn. 586, 591, 13 N.W.2d 754, 757 (1944).
160. See, e.g., Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. North Am. Automotive Warehouse, Inc.,
325 N.W.2d 20, 25 (Minn. 1982) (elements of action for wrongful interference with contract include damages to plaintiff); Pedersen v. Daly, 307 Minn. 163, 165, 238 N.W.2d
620, 622 (1976) (court concerned about disproportionate amount of punitive damages in
relation to size of general verdict); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283,
284-85 (1952) (showing of malicious, willful conduct in assault and battery action allows
for reasonable punitive damages in addition to actual damages sustained); Johnson v.
Wolf, 142 Minn. 352, 355, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919) (jury has discretion to award punitive
damages in addition to actual damages if act was "wanton, malicious, or oppressive");
MacInnis v. National Herald Printing Co., 140 Minn. 171, 175, 167 N.W. 550, 551 (1918)
(punitive damages properly submitted although actual damages were small).
161. See Erickson v. Pomerank, 66 Minn. 376, 377, 69 N.W. 39, 39 (1896).
162. SetLoftsgaarden v. Reiling, 267 Minn. 181, 183-84, 126 N.W.2d 154, 155-56
(1964).
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63
damages does not require the plaintiff to prove actual damages.1
Whether injured or not, the plaintiff is entitled to recourse against
his defamer. 164 The corollary is that the defendant circulating
false charges should "not be the beneficiary of the circumstance
that the plaintiffs character is so well established among his business and professional associates as to preclude proof of specific loss
' 65
springing from communication of libel."'
The supreme court has not expanded the defamation exception
to other causes of action. It has stated in dictum, however, that it
is prepared to apply the rule in appropriate cases where the plaintiff cannot prove actual damages but the defendant should be lia-

ble for willful misconduct.

C

166

Standard of Defendant s Conduct

Section 549.20 provides a precise standard for measuring the defendant's conduct. Subdivision one requires that "the defendant
show a willful indifference to the rights or safety of others" before
punitive damages may be awarded. 167 Courts have employed various standards to gauge a defendant's conduct in determining an
award of punitive damages.
Malice is the legal standard courts most often apply. The Minnesota Supreme Court has defined malice in a number of ways,
including "willful indifference," 168 "reckless disregard for the
rights of others,"' 169 "intentional doing of a wrongful act without
163. Id.
164. Id at 182-83, 126 N.W.2d at 155.
165. Id at 183, 126 N.W.2d at 155. In Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d
252 (Minn. 1980), a salesman with a previously good employment record was forced to
resign because of a personality conflict with his supervisor. Id. at 255. The supervisor told
the employment agency working with plaintiff that he was the worst salesman ever, and
the employment agency then refused to place him. Id The supreme court held that
plaintiff could recover punitive damages even if he could not prove actual damages because employees must be protected from malicious conduct by their employers. Id at 259;
see also National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982) (proof of
actual damages not necessary to recover punitive damages in defamation suit).
166. SeeCaspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 100; 213 N.W.2d 327, 331 (1973) (assuming that plaintiff suffered no bodily injuries, defendant may be liable for punitive damages
under Lofsgaarden).
167. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 1.
168. Utecht v. Shopko Dep't Store, 324 N.W.2d 652, 654 (Minn. 1982) (quoting MINN.
STAT. § 549.20).
169. Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150 (Minn. 1980); Cobb v. Midwest
Recovery Bureau Co., 295 N.W.2d 232, 237 (Minn. 1980); see Ward v. National Car
Rental Sys., 290 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. 1980).
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legal justification,"170 "wanton, . . . fraudulent, or oppressive,"' 7
"conscious violation of the rights" of others,1 7 2 "ruthless,"' 7 3 and
"positive bad faith.' 1 74 Each definition refers to the defendant's
conduct. Punitive damages may be awarded in Minnesota only if
75
the conduct meets the malice standard.
The supreme court has reversed and vacated awards of punitive
damages, and instructed trial courts not to submit the question to
the jury, when the plaintiff has failed to prove malice. In Cobb v.
Midwest Recovety Bureau Co.,' 76 the court reversed an award of punitive damages against a defendant who negligently repossessed a
car. 1 77 The defendant in good faith had concluded that it had
statutory authority to take the action that it did.' 78 The court held
that even if the defendant was negligent, the conduct did not "rise
to the level of willful or reckless disregard for the rights of the
plaintiff."'' 79 In fact, in other cases the supreme court has likened
170. Witte Transp. Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 291 Minn. 461, 465, 193
N.W.2d 148, 151 (1972) (quoting Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn.
457, 462, 205 N.W. 630, 631 (1925)); Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 410, 196 N.W.2d
478, 480 (1972).
171. Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 104 Minn. 49, 52, 116 N.W. 101,
102 (1908) (quoting Berg v. St. Paul Ry., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 192 (1905)).
172. Carli v. Union Depot St. Ry. & Transfer Co., 32 Minn, 101, 104, 20 N.W. 89, 90
(1884).
173. Sneve v. Lunder, 100 Minn. 5, 6, 110 N.W. 99, 100 (1907).
174. Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 72 Minn. 41, 46, 74 N.W. 1022, 1023 (1898).
175. See MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. I (willful indifference). In Anderson, 104 Minn.
49, 116 N.W. 101, the court stated:
It may be that the words 'wilful' and 'unlawful' do not, under all circumstances,
imply malice; but, when used by the court in an instruction in connection with a
statement of the facts which constitute an assault . . . they designate a wrongful
act, done intentionally, without just or reasonable cause, and such as justifies the
jury in awarding exemplary damages.
Id at 53, 116 N.W. at 102.
176. 295 N.W.2d 232 (Minn. 1980) (as amended on denial of rehearing).
177. Id at 233. The defendant repossession company, acting as an agent for the defendant financial corporation, repossessed after the plaintiff had been late repeatedly in
his car payments. Id Prior to repossession, the financial corporation had repeatedly accepted the plaintiff's delinquent payments under two extension agreements. Id at 234.
The jury found the repossession wrongful and awarded the plaintiff $3753.74 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. Id at 233. The supreme court reversed
as to punitive damages, holding that the financial corporation was merely negligent due to
its good faith interpretation of the controlling statutory provision. Id. at 237-38.
178. Id at 237. The court noted "a split of authority regarding the interpretation of
U.C.C. § 9-503 (Minn. Stat. § 336.9-503 (1978))," the controlling statute. Due to this
"good faith dispute over the law," the court held the financial corporation not liable for
punitive damages. Id
179. Id. at 238; see also Ward, 290 N.W.2d at 443 (good faith conduct in instigation of
arrest and false imprisonment did not justify punitive damages).
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malice to crime,1 80 and has been intolerant of actions for punitive
damages that lack any indication of a malicious motive.'""
The court has affirmed punitive damages awards if the plaintiff
makes the requisite showing of malice, that is, the "intentional doing of a harmful act without legal justification."' 8 2 In Huebsch v.
Larson,'8 3 the jury found the defendants liable for conversion of the
plaintiff's calves. 8 4 The animals had wandered onto the defendants' land, and the defendants took and sold them knowing that
they were lost.' 8 5 The court held that the defendants' purpose or
intent to do the wrongful act justified the jury's award of punitive
damages. 8 6 The court has extended the rule of malice to actions
involving willfully wrongful acts by the defendant who does not
87
even know the plaintiff.
180. See Muenkel v. Muenkel, 143 Minn. 29, 33, 173 N.W. 184, 186 (1919) (punitive
damages awarded against defendants who threw rocks through window of plaintiff's
home, one landing near plaintiffs wife and child).
The rules as to exemplary damages apply to wrongful acts punishable as crimes.
The fact that the act committed is a crime as well as a tort is not conclusive of
the right to exemplary damages. But the relation of malice to crime is so close
that we think criminality is proper to be considered in determining whether the
elements necessary to exemplary damages are present.
Id (citations omitted).
181. See, e.g., Benson Coop. Creamery Ass'n v. First Dist. Ass'n, 276 Minn. 520, 151
N.W.2d 422 (1967). In Benson, the plaintiff was dismissed from defendant dairy product
association, a relationship essential to the plaintiffs business interests. The court held,
"To justify an award for punitive damages, the wrongful act must have been done with
malicious motive. Such damages are intended as punishment for a willfully wrongful act,
done with malice." Id at 528-29, 151 N.W.2d at 427 (footnote omitted).
182. Johnson v. Radde, 293 Minn. 409, 410, 196 N.W.2d 478, 480 (1972) (defining
malice).
183. 291 Minn. 361, 191 N.W.2d 433 (1971).
184. Id at 361, 191 N.W.2d at 434. The jury awarded $380 in compensatory damages
and $750 in punitive damages. The trial court, however, ordered judgment notwithstanding the verdict awarding only compensatory damages. d.at 361-62, 191 N.W.2d at 434.
185. Id at 362-63, 191 N.W.2d at 434. The defendants cared for the calves for nine
days while they contacted at least one of their neighbors in an effort to find the owner.
Their efforts to find the rightful owner were not extensive. Id
186. Id at 364, 191 N.W.2d at 435. "There is a strong policy against conversion of
property. The strength of that policy is demonstrated by the fact that punitive damages
may be recovered when the conversion is accompanied by a reckless disregard for the
rights of others." Id
187. See Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Minn. 1980) (animal warden killed plaintiffs cat without impounding the animal for five business days as required
by statute).
[The animal warden] did not act with malice toward the plaintiff; he did not
know who the cat's owner was. Nevertheless, the award of punitive damages was
appropriate because [the animal warden's] conduct in killing the cat within
hours of its impoundment evinces a willful disregard for both the law and the
property rights of private citizens.
Id at 151. Thus, an act of malice against the law or property rights is sufficient.
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The court has taken varied approaches in actions against joint
tortfeasors. In Nelson v. Halvorson,"8 the trial court instructed the
jury that each of two defendants must be liable for an equal
amount of punitive damages. 8 9 The supreme court held that this
instruction was erroneous because the jury was unable to consider
whether one of the defendants had acted in good faith.' 90 In addition, the court ruled that damages should be assessed separately,
because "[t]he difference in financial condition of the two defendants would alone justify the jury in imposing different
amounts."''
The Nelson rule satisfies the punishment and deterrence functions of punitive damages by requiring that the conduct of joint
tortfeasors be evaluated separately. Consequently, this approach
should apply even when the defenaants participate in the same
event that harms the plaintiff.
Separate verdicts seem to be imperative if the prerequisite for
punitive damages is a finding that the defendant's actions were
malicious or willfully indifferent. Separate verdicts also allow the
jury to assess an amount of punitive damages based on the defendant's ability to pay.
In meetings regarding the statutory standard, the legislators
considered the large punitive damages awards in products liability
actions. 9 2 The legislature received testimony expressing concern
that the current national trend in products liability actions reflected increases in the frequency and amount of punitive damages
awards. 93 The legislature also grappled with problems in attributing intent to a corporate entity for purposes of assessing punitive
188. 117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912). Plaintiff sued a businessman for wrongful
attachment and the constable who served the writ for false arrest. Id.at 256, 135 N.W. at
818.
189. Id at 259, 135 N.W. at 819.
190. Id "The actual damages from an unlawful act may not be mitigated, strictly
speaking, by showing absence of actual malice. But the rule as to punitive damages is that
good faith and a proper purpose shown either lessens or avoids them." Id.
191. Id at 260, 135 N.W. at 819.
192. Heins, Statutog Changes in Minnesota Tort Law---1978, HENN. LAW., Sept.-Oct.
1978, at 6.
193. Id, see also Minnesota-lowa Television Co., 294 N.W.2d at 310-11 (quoting Heins,
supra note 192, at 6); Meeting on HF 338 Before the Minnesota Senatejudtiay Subcommittee on
JudcialAdministratton,70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., Feb. 1, 6, 1978 (audio tape); Meeting on
HF 338 Before the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Judcial Adminlrtraton, 70th
Minn. Legis., 1977 Sess., May 3, 1977 (audio tape); Floor Debate on H.F 338 Before the
Minnesota Senate, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., Mar. 16, 1978 (audio tape).
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damages. The author of the statute, Senator Davies, 194 referred in
committee' 95 to the "Pinto case,""16 and the Richardson-Merrell,
Inc. cases, 97 which involved corporate defendants' knowledge of
their products' dangerous propensities. The Minnesota statute,
like the common law, requires intentional conduct, or at least indifference by the defendant toward the rights of the plaintiff. One
author has defined "indifference" to mean:
'Indifference' to the public safety conveys the idea that the
manufacturer simply does not care whether or to what extent
the public safety may be endangered by its product despite the
availability of feasible means to reduce the danger substantially. It implies a basic disrespect and consequent disregard
for the interests of others.' 9
Since Minnesota's statute apparently requires awareness by the defendant of wrongdoing, the plaintiff likely will be under a more
difficult burden of proof as to corporate defendants.
By comparison, in non-products cases the willful indifference
standard will not significantly affect the law of punitive damages
as it developed at common law. The various terms used to describe the defendant's requisite conduct included malice, willful,
wanton, and reckless. 99 The language has changed, but knowledge and intent are still basic elements of recovery under the statute. Essentially, then, the new standard appears to be a
codification of common law.
D.

Factors Used to Determine the Amount of
Punitive Damages

At common law, the discretion to award punitive damages and
the amount to be awarded rested with the jury. 20 0 The original
draft version of the punitive damages statute followed the common
law by allowing the trier of fact to determine whether punitive
damages should be awarded. This draft version, however, pro194. Senator Davies is a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law in Saint
Paul, Minnesota.
195. See Meeting on HY 338 Before the Minnesota Senate jud iary Subcommittee on Judicial
Administration, 70th Minn. Legis., 1978 Sess., Feb. 22, 1978 (audio tape).
196. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 348, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
197. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir. 1967); Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
198. Owen, Punitive Damagesin ProductsLiabiti Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1368
(1976) (footnotes omitted).
199. See supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
200. See inf/a notes 203-31 and accompanying text.
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vided that the court would determine the amount of those damages. 20 1 This version was later amended to provide that the
amount awarded remains in the discretion of the trier of fact, the
02

2
court, or a jury.

1.

The Role of the Jug

Once the plaintiff has made an adequate showing of willful misconduct, the fate of a claim for punitive damages rests with the
20 3
jury. The jury decides whether to award punitive damages.
Additionally, the amount of punitive damages is a matter "emphatically for the jury. 2 0 4 As a fact question peculiar to each
case, an award of punitive damages is never determinative of what
20 5
award is proper in another case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has consistently and zealously
guarded the jury's discretion to award punitive damages. The
court has reversed lower courts for interfering with the jury's reasonable exercise of its discretion. On several occasions, the court
has held that it is reversible error for the trial court to direct the
jury to award punitive damages. In Kirschbaum v. Lowry, 20 6 the
201. Professor Owen's analysis of this rationale is as follows:
First, it would reduce the probability that punitive damages awards might be
unduly influenced by emotion, since most judges are presumably more detached
in their deliberation and therefore more likely to render objective damages assessments. Additionally, evidence of the defendant's wealth that could prejudice
the jury on the issue of liability could then be excluded from jury consideration.
Further, judges would be able to call upon their experience in criminal sentencing, unavailable to jurors, in evaluating the need for punishment and deterrence
in particular cases. Finally, trial judges usually have a more sophisticated appreciation than jurors of the often far-reaching effects that punitive damages awards
may have on the operations of particular corporate defendants.
Owen, supra note 198, at 1320-21.
202. MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1982).
203. See Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 312 (citing Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146,
150-51 (Minn. 1980)) (whether punitive damages are appropriate under the facts of a
particular case is within discretion of the jury, and weight and force given to the evidence
is exclusively a jury question); Huebsch v. Larson, 291 Minn. 361, 364, 191 N.W.2d 433,
435 (1971) (whether punitive damages are allowed rests in the discretion of the jury under
all circumstances of the case); Crea v. Wuellner, 235 Minn. 408, 411, 51 N.W.2d 283, 284
(1952) (if evidence shows wanton or malicious conduct, question of allowing punitive
damages is for the jury in the exercise of its sound discretion); Johnson v. Wolf, 142 Minn.
352, 354, 172 N.W. 216, 217 (1919) (any evidence warranting allowance of punitive damages is considered solely by the jury); Lynd v. Picket, 7 Minn. 184, 200 (Gil. 128, 142-43)
(1862) (jury is permitted to award punitive damages).
204. Sweeney v. Meyers, 199 Minn. 21, 24, 270 N.W. 906, 907 (1937) (citing Peck v.
Small, 35 Minn. 465, 467, 29 N.W. 69, 70 (1886)).
205. Bronson Steel Arch Shoe Co. v. T.K. Kelly Inv. Co., 183 Minn. 135, 139, 236
N.W. 204, 206 (1931).
206. 165 Minn. 233, 206 N.W. 171 (1925).
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trial court directed the jury to award punitive damages if it found
that the defendant had willfully and wantonly assaulted the plaintiff.20

7

On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court had

improperly interfered with the jurors' discretion. 20 8 The court
stated that the jury's "good sense and sound judgment" should de20 9
termine whether punitive damages should be awarded.
Similarly, in Sneve v. Lunder,210 the supreme court held that instructing the jury that the defendant deserved to be punished was
equivalent to directing an award of punitive damages. 2 1t According to the Sneve court, the trial court's duty is to explain to the jury
the meaning of punitive damages, and to state the circumstances
21 2
and conditions upon which such damages may be awarded.
21 3
The jury may then award punitive damages in its discretion.
The court has also held that it is error not to instruct jurors that
2t 4
awarding punitive damages is within their discretion.
Once a jury exercises its discretion, Minnesota courts rarely interfere with its findings. An award will be disturbed only when it
is so excessive as to be deemed unreasonable. 215 An unreasonable
award is often determined by the trial court to be excessive and
21 6
the result of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury.
217
In Marston v. Mnneapohs Clinic of PschtalTy & Neurology, L Id,
the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's refusal to
disturb a punitive damages award of $50,000.2 18 The court noted

that the defendant made no showing of passion or prejudice by the
jury; that no prejudicial testimony or comments were heard which
would have acted to inflate the size of the damages award; and
that sufficient evidence of malice existed to justify an award of
207. Id.at 237, 206 N.W. at 173.
208. See id at 236-37, 206 N.W. at 173.
209. Id.at 236, 206 N.W. at 173.
210. 100 Minn. 5, 110 N.W. 99 (1907).
211. Id at 6,110 N.W.at 100.
212. Id
213. Id
214. See Berg v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 96 Minn. 513, 515, 105 N.W. 191, 191-92 (1905).
215. See Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 259 (Minn. 1980) (citing
Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 209, 115 N.W.2d 259, 266, cert.
denied, 371 U.S.
862 (1962)).
216. See Hammersten, 262 Minn. at 209, 115 N.W.2d at 265-66; Bronson Steel Arch Shoe
Co., 183 Minn. at 139, 236 N.W. at 206.
217. 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1983) (as modified on denial of rehearing).
218. Id.at 311-12. The jury assessed the punitive damage award against a therapist for
having sex with naive patients in violation of the rules and ethical cannons governing his
profession. Id at 312.
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2 9
punitive damages. 1
In Meha v. Chap/'in,2 20 the court left undisturbed a punitive
damages award of $35,000 despite serious reservations about the
size of the verdict. 22' The court stated that the amount of punitive
damages should not exceed that necessary to properly punish and
deter.2 2 2 Nevertheless, the court was constrained to deny a new
trial because the defendant offered no evidence of his inability to
pay. 223 Thus, despite explicit reluctance to affirm an award of punitive damages, judges will do so rather than interfere with the
224
reasonable exercise of the jury's discretion.

Where the supreme court has reduced a jury's award of punitive
damages, it has done so reluctantly. In Stanger v. Gordon,22 5 the
court reduced a punitive damages award of $12,900, stating:
Mindful as we are of intruding on a function addressed almost
entirely to the trial judge's discretion, we are collectively agreed
that the punitive damages should be reduced to $7,500. We do
not, as is generally the case, condition this reduction upon
plaintiff's consent because we regard a retrial limited to the istrial on all
sue of punitive damages as impractical and a 2new
26
issues as realistically unacceptable to plaintiff.
The jury's discretion in weighing the evidence and determining
the amount of punitive damages is now guided by Minnesota's punitive damages statute. 227 The punitive damages statute does not
list the plaintiffs injury as a factor in determining the amount of a
punitive damages award. 228 Although the Eisert court ruled that
the nature of the plaintiffs injury may be considered in determining punitive damages, 229 Ezsert was decided solely on the plaintiff's
claim for relief in strict products liability, 2 0 and may therefore be
219. Id at 312.
220. 327 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1982).
221. Id at 20 n.. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2000 in compensatory damages and
$35,000 in punitive damages against a police officer who used unnecessary force in making
an arrest. Id at 20.
222. Id at 20 n.1.
223. Id at 20.
224. See id.
225. 309 Minn. 215, 244 N.W.2d 628 (1976).
226. Id at 222, 244 N.W.2d at 632. Two factors peculiar to this case appear to have
made the supreme court's decision to reduce the award easier. First, the plaintiff had
asked only for $7500 in punitive damages. Second, the court felt that certain comments of
the plaintiff's counsel may have improperly influenced the size of the award. See id.
227. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1982).
228. See id.
229. Eisert, 314 N.W.2d at 229.
230. Id.at 228.
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distinguishable from claims such as negligence which focus on the
23
defendant's conduct. '
2. Statutory Guidance
Subdivision three of Minnesota Statutes section 549.20232 lists
factors to be considered in awarding punitive damages. The factors relate to the defendant's conduct, knowledge, remorse or lack
thereof, and financial condition. 233 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has applied these criteria in one non-products case af234
firming, but reducing, an award of punitive damages.
Perhaps the most interesting factor in the statute is "the total
effect of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damages awards to the plaintiff and other simdary situated
persons."235 In other words, the factfinder, when determining the
amount of punitive damages, is to consider whether the defendant
has already been punished and deterred by punitive damages in
other actions arising from the same type of misconduct.
This factor raises issues peculiar to products liability actions. Is
it fair to allow "the first to the well" to collect an amount of punitive damages that perhaps should be shared among all harmed
persons? Is it fair for the first plaintiff in a mass disaster case to
"break the bank" by collecting a large punitive damages award,
231. In Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980), the court reviewed an
award of punitive damages based solely on evidence relating to defendant's conduct. See
id. at 151. The conduct involved the killing of plaintiffs cat by the defendant animal
warden. Id.at 147.
232. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1982) states:
Any award of punitive damages shall be measured by those factors which justly
bear upon the purpose of punitive damages, including the seriousness of hazard
to the public arising from the defendant's misconduct, the profitability of the
misconduct to the defendant, the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it, the degree of the defendant's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the
misconduct, the number and level of employees involved in causing or concealing the misconduct, the financial condition of the defendant, and the total effect
of other punishment likely to be imposed upon the defendant as a result of the
misconduct, including compensatory and punitive damage awards to the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons, and the severity of any criminal penalty
to which the defendant may be subject.
233. Id
234. See Wilson, 297 N.W.2d 146. The Wilson court stated that a court examining the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award should consider "among other factors, the
degree of malice, intent, or willful disregard, the type of interest invaded, the amount
needed to truly deter such conduct in the future, and the cost of bringing the suit." Id at
151 (citing MINN. STAT. § 549.20 (1978)).
235. MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 3 (1982) (emphasis added).
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and for subsequent plaintiffs to recover no punitive damages because the juries were informed of the first plaintiff's large award?
The first plaintiff alone receives a windfall because his trial was
first in time. Although plaintiffs in Minnesota are not entitled as a
matter of right to punitive damages, 23 6 subsequent plaintiffs may
be in a worse position than the first plaintiff who receives adjudication of his claim.2 3 7 Yet, one author suggests that there is some
merit to awarding punitive damages to the first plaintiff: "This
conception ignores the enormous diligence, imagination, and financial outlay required of initial plaintiffs to uncover and to prove
the flagrant misconduct of a product manufacturer. In fact, subsequent plaintiffs will often ride to favorable verdicts and settlements on the coattails of the firstcomers. ' ' 238

Plaintiffs' attorneys

whose clients do not participate in an initial punitive damages
award must develop arguments in support of sharing such awards
with the initial plaintiff. Counsel for all parties, however, should
benefit from the legislature's codification of the guidelines to determine the amount of a punitive damages award.
E.

Principal'sLiabilityfor Acts of His Agent

Prior to the enactment of Minnesota Statutes section 549.20, the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the theory of respondeat superior in assessing punitive damages against a principal or master
for the malicious acts of its agent or servant.23 9 One commentator
suggested, however, that the theory of respondeat superior has no
place in the law of punitive damages:
The 'deep pocket' notion, which has as its sole objective the
shifting of a loss to one who is financially able to compensate
the victim, is inapplicable to damages that are not intended to
be compensatory . ..the better risk-spreader notion is flatly

inconsistent with the stated purposes of punitive damages, since
of the loss dulls the sting and weakens
the spreading
240
deterrence.
236. See supra note 131.
237. A 1984 United States Senate bill seeks to limit punitive damages recovery for
products liability to the first plaintiff. S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); see
Larson & Wattson, The Discovery and Proofof a Pun'tive Damage Claim.- Strategy Decisions and
Pretrial Tactics When Representing the Plaintiff, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 395, 401 n.28
(1985).
238. Owen, supra note 198, at 1325 (footnote omitted).
239. Schmidt v. Minor, 150 Minn. 236, 239, 184 N.W. 964, 965 (1921); Peterson v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 75 Minn. 368, 372, 77 N.W. 985, 985-86 (1899).
240. Ellis, supra note 8, at 1038.
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Nevertheless, the supreme court followed the rule that "[o]ne who
employs another to do an act for his benefit, and who has the
choice of the agent, ought to take the risk of injury to third persons
'24
by the manner in which he does the business." '

Minnesota's punitive damages statute codifies the concept of vicarious liability for punitive damages, limiting awardability
against a principal to certain situations. To analyze these situations, vicarious liability may be viewed as arising in two contexts:
the private corporation and the municipality.
I.

Private Corporations

By the turn of the century, Minnesota law was well-settled that
a private corporation could be liable for punitive damages attributable to the malicious conduct of its agents or servants acting
within the scope of their employment. 242 In the early case of

Schmidt v. Mnor,243 the son of a hotel owner started a fight with an
employee who had resigned.2 44 The supreme court affirmed a punitive damages award against the owner for his son's malicious assault and battery. 245 Although the principal did not ratify the
agent's actions, the court held he was liable because the agent's
actions were in the performance of his duties and within the scope
of his employment. 246 One rationale the court used to support vicarious liability for punitive damages is the selection of agents by
the principal and the responsibility principals must accept for the
agents' propensity to harm.2

47

The rule also recognizes that a busi-

ness of any size is conducted through agents and servants who
have direct contact with others. 248 Finally, the court held that it
would "be equivalent to abolishing" punitive damages "for a judgment against an employee is often uncollectable and no punish2 49
ment to the wrongdoer."
Minnesota's punitive damages statute offers the principal more
protection than did the common law for the malicious acts of an
errant agent. The statute requires the plaintiff to show that the
241. Peterson, 75 Minn. at 373, 77 N.W. at 986.
242. Hammer v. Forde, 125 Minn. 146, 148, 145 N.W. 810, 811 (1914).
243. 150 Minn. 236, 184 N.W. 964 (1921).
244. Id at 238, 184 N.W. at 965.
245. Id at 240, 184 N.W. at 966.
246. Id at 239, 184 N.W. at 965.
247. Id at 240, 184 N.W. at 966.
248. Id
249. Id
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agent's conduct is attributable to the superior. The statute states

in relevant part:
Subd. 2. Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a
master or principal because of an act done by an agent only if:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the
act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was
acting in the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified

25
or approved the act.

0

The statute overrules the common law standard that required the
plaintiff to show only that he was harmed by an agent engaged in
his duties and within the scope of his employment.
Subdivision two is very similar to section 909 of the Restatement
(Second) of Tors.25 I The comments to section 909 state in part:
It is . . . within the general spirit of the rule to make liable an

employer who has recklessly employed or retained a servant or
employee who was known to be vicious, if the harm resulted
from the characteristic. Nor is it unjust that a person on whose
account another has acted should be responsible for an outrageous act for which he otherwise would not be if, with full
knowledge of the act and the way in which it was done, he
ratifies it, or, in cases in which he would be liable for the act
but not subject to punitive damages, he expresses approval of
it.

250.
251.
252.

252

MINN. STAT. § 549.20, subd. 2.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 909 (1979).
Id., comment b. Illustrations given by this section are as follows:
1. A employs an ejectment company to dispossess a tenant. A knows that
the company has a reputation for using undue force in dealing with
tenants. An employee of the company, in accordance with its usual
methods, commits an unprovoked battery upon B, the wife of the tenant, in order to induce her to leave. In an action by B against A, punitive damages can properly be awarded.
2. A, the owner of a theatre, employs a special policeman to keep order. In
ejecting a small boy from the theatre, the policeman cruelly abuses him.
Upon learning the facts, A expresses his approval. Punitive damages
can properly be awarded against A in an action for the battery.
3. A, a corporation owning a series of retail stores, employs B as operations
manager to supervise the management of the units. While visiting a
unit B discovers facts that lead him to believe erroneously that one of
the clerks has been stealing. He directs the local manager to imprison
the clerk. In the ensuing interview he permits the local manager to use
outrageous means of intimidation. In the clerk's action against the corporation, punitive damages can properly be awarded.
Id, illustrations 1-3.
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Subdivision 2(c) of section 549.20, requiring the agent to be employed in a managerial capacity and acting in the scope of employment, is more restrictive than the common law. Comment a
to section 21 7C of the Restatement (Second) ofAgengy25 3 notes, "some
courts impose liability upon a master for unauthorized wanton
acts of servants who are not managers; others do not. ' ' 254 Minne-

sota's common law did not limit "scope of employment" liability
to managers.2 55 Thus, the Minnesota statute further limits a principal's liability for punitive damages. Nevertheless, "managerial
256
capacity" is not defined, allowing some flexibility for the courts.
2. Muntcipalhties
Minnesota law prohibits recovery of punitive damages against
municipal corporations.2 57 Although the punitive damages law
pertaining to employer municipalities is settled, employees of municipalities may be liable for punitive damages.
In Douglas v. City of Ainneapolis, 258 a citizen challenged the city
council's decision to pay punitive damages on behalf of city police
officers who were found liable for violating the civil rights of private citizens. 259 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the city
was empowered to indemnify municipal employees against punitive damages awards under "fitting and proper" circumstances. 26 °
The court assumed, however, that the employees' actions leading
to the judgment occurred in the performance of duties, and did
not arise as a result of "malfeasance in office or wilful or wanton
'26 1
neglect of duty."

253.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY

§ 909 (1979) duplicates

§ 217C (1957).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

217C (1957).
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C comment a (1957); see also City of
Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 92 n.14, 239 N.W.2d 197, 205 n.14 (1976).
255. See id. at 91-92, 239 N.W.2d at 204 (City of Minneapolis held liable for punitive
damages for actions of police officers who violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act); see
also Anderson v. International Harvester Co. of Am., 104 Minn. 49, 116 N.W. 101 (1908).
256. The Minnesota Supreme Court has had one opportunity to consider vicarious
liability for punitive damages, but did not address the question. In Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1983) (as modified on
denial of rehearing) the court found no evidence in the record to support an award of
punitive damages against the employer, and did not address the employer's liability for
punitive damages because the issue was not before it on appeal. 329 N.W.2d at 312.
257. See MINN. STAT. § 466.04, subd. 1 (1982).
258. 304 Minn. 259, 230 N.W.2d 577 (1975).
259. Id. at 265, 230 N.W.2d at 583.
260. Id at 270, 230 N.W.2d at 585.
261. Id at 273-74, 230 N.W.2d at 587.
OF TORTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
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The city's decision to assume liability for the actions of its agents
could be viewed as an incentive to recruit and train better and
more dependable employees, particularly those vested with police
power. The taxpayer, however, who exercises no control over officials and would not condone illegal acts by them, ultimately pays
the judgment.
In Douglas, the supreme court encouraged municipalities to carefully scrutinize a decision to indemnify their employees based on
the following considerations: whether the employee acted in good
faith; whether he acted pursuant to a superior's orders; whether
paying or not paying the judgment would affect morale; whether
the act was deemed to be in the line of duty; whether the act was
the result of malfeasance in office or willful or wanton neglect of
duty; and whether it is fitting and proper to pay the judgment
262
based on the public's and the municipality's best interests.
The court has also held that the punitive damages statute did
not change the law of municipal liability for punitive damages in
respondeat superior.2 63 Thus, municipal employees remain subject
to claims for punitive damages, and municipalities in proper cases
may indemnify them.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The punitive damages remedy is quasi-criminal in nature,
blending together in a civil action punishment and deterrence of
unacceptable conduct with a cash award to the plaintiff. Minnesota courts have applied well-settled principles underlying the law
of punitive damages to arrive at just results. The Minnesota
Supreme Court has, on occasion, departed from these principles
and arrived at results which cannot be fully explained. Nevertheless, the legislature has now codified the punitive damages remedy,
establishing jurisdictional and evidentiary requirements for punitive damages awards. The statute emphasizes the conduct of the
defendant in measuring awards of punitive damages, and should
give the courts guidance in future cases. Even with the additional
262. Id at 270-71, 230 N.W.2d at 585-86.
263. See Paradise v. City of Minneapolis, 297 N.W.2d 152, 156 n.5 (Minn. 1980) (prohibition against municipal liability for punitive damages does not prohibit such liability of
municipal employees and officers); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980)
(construing MINN. STAT. § 466.04, subd. la (1978) to allow punitive damages against municipal officers and employees).
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393

guidelines provided by the statute, the powerful remedy of punitive damages will require close judicial scrutiny to insure its reasoned application.
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